Central bankers are expected to communicate facts about the economy and shape individuals’ expectations about the economic future. However, credibility in economic affairs is often male-coded, particularly around the anti-inflationary commitments that central banks often need to project. Does gender shape central bankers’ effectiveness as communicators? We approach our research question with an experimental design in which survey takers are given an informational vignette that is variously attributed to male and female ECB Executive Board members, who are in turn introduced with or without their full credentials. We use this data to examine whether female central bankers are differently able to shape individuals’ economic beliefs and expectations, and trust in the ECB. We surveyed nationally representative samples from five euro-area countries. Our results show that female central bankers capable of generating optimism about the economy and trust in the ECB, but only when they are introduced with their credentials. We also found evidence of a backlash against credentialed men, particularly among male survey takers. The findings have, in our view, mixed normative and practical implications about gender representation in central banking. Female central bankers were both discriminated against - women need to be introduced with their credentials to be taken as seriously as uncredentialed male central bankers - but also the optimal vessel for information, because credentialed men are so greatly disliked.