Proffering material goods in return for electoral support: The Effect of the Hungarian Village Programme on Vote Share in Hungary
P2-2
Presented by: Krisztina Szabo
The past decade has witnessed an explosion of research into policy feedback effects on mass publics as well as into
the effect of different distributive policies on electoral support. Proffering of material goods takes different forms
of materially oriented political strategies. This paper examines the effect of two subsidy programmes targeting
rural areas on electoral support for Hungary’s right-wing ruling party (Fidesz). The first programme, the Rural
Hungarian Family Housing Allowance Program (programmatic distributive strategy), was given directly to individuals
living in eligible small settlements. The second programme, the Hungarian Village Program (pork-barrel
politics), provided an indirect support to individuals by proffering public resources to the local governments in
eligible small settlements. Both programmes were introduced between the European Parliamentary elections in
May 2019, and the local elections in October 2019 that allows us to implement a difference in differences estimation
strategy by comparing electoral outcomes before and after the introduction of the policies. We provide
evidence that direct rather than indirect subsidies increase the ruling party’s vote share.
the effect of different distributive policies on electoral support. Proffering of material goods takes different forms
of materially oriented political strategies. This paper examines the effect of two subsidy programmes targeting
rural areas on electoral support for Hungary’s right-wing ruling party (Fidesz). The first programme, the Rural
Hungarian Family Housing Allowance Program (programmatic distributive strategy), was given directly to individuals
living in eligible small settlements. The second programme, the Hungarian Village Program (pork-barrel
politics), provided an indirect support to individuals by proffering public resources to the local governments in
eligible small settlements. Both programmes were introduced between the European Parliamentary elections in
May 2019, and the local elections in October 2019 that allows us to implement a difference in differences estimation
strategy by comparing electoral outcomes before and after the introduction of the policies. We provide
evidence that direct rather than indirect subsidies increase the ruling party’s vote share.