Does international interdependence influence fiscal responses to debt crises? The notion that policies diffuse from one country to another is well understood in political science and economics. The ways in which this could happen in the context of debt crisis resolution policies, however, remains largely unexplored. By focusing on the external and domestic incentives of sovereign debt repayment, the literature on sovereign default indeed typically neglects the role of across-state learning mechanisms in shaping sovereign debt management. To fill that gap, this paper fits a longitudinal network model to assess whether and how defaulting countries observe the experiences of others, when restructuring their debts with foreign private creditors. In particular, the model tests whether incumbents look at the impact that given repayment actions have had on the economic and electoral performance of peer governments in other countries. Results seem to indicate that this is indeed the case: past electoral and economic performance in other countries significantly affects the probability that governments adopt the same repayment behaviour as others.