09:30 - 11:10
P1
Room: South Room 225
Panel Session 1
Selim Erdem Aytaç, David Steinberg - Economic Insecurity and Voter Attitudes about Currency Crises
Rubén Ruiz-Rufino - ADVERSE ECONOMIC SHOCKS, MONETARY INTEGRATION AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION.
Oleksandr Shevchuk - Rescuing the Rich? Financial crisis management and inequality
Alessandra Romani - The Role of International Interdependence in Sovereign Debt Management: A Network Model of Debt Crisis Resolution Policies
ADVERSE ECONOMIC SHOCKS, MONETARY INTEGRATION AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION.
P1-02
Presented by: Rubén Ruiz-Rufino
Rubén Ruiz-Rufino
King's College London
The financial crisis observed in the European Monetary Union (EMU) between
2010 and 2015 brought about relevant political changes. In some countries, such
changes altered consolidated institutional equilibria with regard to political representation.
Focusing on cross-country variations of electoral fragmentation between
1946 and 2020, this article analyses how exposure to financial crises and
financial assistance explain the stability of electoral competition. Using pooled
and difference-in-difference analyses, the main finding of this research shows that
exposure to economic shocks results in more electoral fragmentation only when
nation-states lose much of their decision-making power to use local knowledge to
identify and adopt suitable economic policies to face economic adversities. The
events unfolding in the EMU during the Eurocrisis illustrate this mechanism where
countries that were financially bailout experienced dramatic political changes compared
to not only other EMU members-states but also to non-EMU countries which
too received assistance during the same period.