09:30 - 11:10
P1
Room: South Room 222
Panel Session 1
Pedro Riera - The underrepresentation of the left in districted PR systems
Daniel Smith - How Do Electoral Rules Shape Candidate Selection, Campaign Spending, and Political Representation? Evidence from Japan, 1965-2016
Orit Kedar - Proportional representation with districts: Conceptualization and measurement
Irene Menendez Gonzalez - Trade Origins of Proportional Representation
How Do Electoral Rules Shape Candidate Selection, Campaign Spending, and Political Representation? Evidence from Japan, 1965-2016
P1-02
Presented by: Daniel Smith
Alexander Fouirnaies 1, Daniel Smith 2
1 University of Chicago
2 Columbia University
Most existing studies of how electoral rules shape elections use aggregate data, lack plausibly exogenous variation in institutional variables of theoretical interest, and do not give a comprehensive account of the effects of rules on each stage of the electoral process. We study how district magnitude---a key source of institutional variation in electoral systems---shapes all stages of the electoral process. We collect new data on Japanese candidates and campaigns spanning five decades, and we use a difference-in-differences design based on within-district variation induced by court-mandated changes in magnitude. The results indicate that an increase in magnitude deepens and diversifies the partisan and demographic composition of the candidate pool. In addition, it reduces the average campaign spending per elector, and this effect is primarily driven by established candidates reducing spending on staff and printed materials. Finally, it weakens the electoral advantage of the dominant party, increases proportionality between vote and seat shares, and increases turnout.