In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), incumbent parties experience large electoral losses. Very few governments from the region managed to gain electoral support after sitting in the government. The costs of ruling are quite severe in CEECs and the literature points to the effect of economy and corruption (Roberts 2008; Jastramskis 2020). Yet the existing retrospective economic voting literature focuses on how the economic conditions affect the support for the last cabinet before the election. This approach is reasonable in stable systems of advanced democracies; however, it seems static in the systems with frequent cabinet reshuffles like in CEECs. Moreover, political situation in CEE countries often results in a caretaker cabinet with non-partisan ministers. In addition to that, political parties in CEE are very unstable and often go through the processes of fission and fusion in almost every electoral term (Ibenskas 2016). In effect, cabinets in CEECs are more unstable and the instability of parties and cabinets leads to blurring the clarity of responsibility. We use aggregate-level data for 11 CEE countries since 1990 to analyze economic voting in relation to this blurring of responsibility. To do so, we combine the electoral results data with detailed information about party restructuring. Overall, our research points to the effect of party organization changes and cabinet reshuffles on the level of retrospective economic voting.