Closed-list proportional representation is widely considered as producing politicians engaging in programmatic and party-oriented behavior. Personal vote-seeking and local responsiveness, however, are attributed to open-list or plurality systems. In this paper, I argue that the focus on inter-party competition misses the potential for personal vote-seeking and local responsiveness emanating from incentives of intra-party competition for renomination. Specifically, it's parties' candidate selection methods that rely on locally-minded delegates that introduce the incentive for incumbents to engage in local responsiveness. Using an original and novel data-set based on (historical) nomination protocols of the German Green party, survey experiments with delegates and geo-referenced legislative behavior, I can show that locally responsive incumbents are rewarded with better ranks and higher margins, that this is mainly limited to men who face greater competition and that delegates indeed prefer locally-minded incumbents. My findings shed new light on the interplay of electoral and selectoral incentives for behavior.