Assessments of extreme outcomes are often made by experts using scientific methods. Many think that science should aim to free from value-judgments. But others claim that value-judgments do play an essential role in science in general and in risk assessments in particular. What role do value-judgments play in the process of developing, communicating and using science-based assessments of extreme outcomes?
This paper examines the role of value-judgments in cases of extreme scenarios of coastal flooding, fluvial flooding, and severe storms developed for the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The methodology consists of a multiple case-study (Yin 2004), including interviews with scientists and experts involved in developing the extreme scenarios.
The cases are analyzed using two theoretical perspectives from the philosophy of science. The first is the "argument from inductive risk" (Douglas 2009, Elliot & Richards 2017). This argument essentially says that scientists have choices when setting appropriate standards of evidence for accepting or rejecting hypotheses. These choices involve considerations related to the risks involved in assuming an erroneous hypothesis (hence the name "inductive risk"). The second perspective is the hypothesis that the justification of values in science ultimately come from the aims or goals of the scientific activity (Elliott & McKaughan 2014, De Melo-MartÃn and Intemann 2016). Can these perspectives explain the role of value judgments in the studied cases?
The case study will be finished during spring 2018, and the findings will be presented at the conference. A better understanding of the practical role of value-judgments in extreme scenarios and the examples from the case study might be useful both for scientists and experts involved in developing and communicating extreme scenarios, as well as for end-users in public and private organizations.