Remarkable advances have made in quantitative assessment technologies for supporting risk decisions. Without careful implementation of institutional framework to exploit them in light of each socio-technical context, however, they could not necessarily contribute to improve the quality of management decisions.
The authors analyzed in their recent publications the cases on the use of two assessment technologies in Japan, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI). They pointed out that the linkage between those assessment methods and management decision-making processes have been poorly articulated and resulted in dysfunctional. Based on those analysis, the authors will critically discuss the lessons still unlearned from the Fukushima accident, namely, lack of function of integrating diverse information into decision process and absence of responsible organizational entities, from both risk and crisis management viewpoints.
Regarding risk management, Japanese nuclear industry is now striving for proactive use of PRA, while it’s still in a learning process of the essence of risk-informed decision making (RIDM). Yet, the regulatory authority has solidified its stance as focusing only on “purely scientific and technical” issues without taking into consideration other essential elements of risk governance such as societal concerns and economic implications, backlashing against the “regulatory capture” criticism after the accident. No organization officially assumes a key role of integrating various information including technical, societal and ethical ones, while it should be an essential part of RIDM.
Meanwhile, Japanese nuclear emergency management still lacks the function of establishing strategic advice for management decisions, as well. The nuclear emergency scheme before 2011 had had strong dependence on SPEEDI, a real-time simulation system for calculating possible radiological consequences, without considering its great and particular uncertainties. After its ‘failure’ in the face of Fukushima disaster, the new regulatory authority totally denied its usefulness and banned its utilization for emergency response, rather than restructuring institutional framework and practical capability for addressing SPEEDI’s inherent uncertainties and consolidating assorted information for providing emergency decision-makers with more constructive advice.
Our paper will shed light on a deeper perspective of these policy failures in reference to risk governance framework and cross-national comparisons.