Partner Selection and Reputation Signaling Escalate Coalitionary Conflict
Intergroup conflict emerges when individuals coalesce in groups to compete with (individuals in) rivaling out-groups. Whereas the dynamics and consequences of intergroup conflict are increasingly well-understood, we lack insight into how individuals select others and form groups for coalitionary conflict.
To examine the possibility that (i) individuals prefer cooperators for coalitionary conflict yet (ii) cooperators signal selfishness to avoid being selected for conflict, we performed three experiments. We predicted that individuals prefer for coalitionary conflict partners with a cooperative rather than selfish reputation (Hypothesis 1). For reputation signaling, we had contrasting hypotheses. Past work on reputation signaling and partner selection in public goods provision suggests that individuals publicly signal cooperative inclinations (Hypothesis 2a). However, because joining coalitionary conflict may be individually unattractive, we also tested the alternative Hypothesis 2b that in intergroup contests individuals may prefer to publicly signal selfish rather than cooperative inclinations.
Predictions were tested in incentivized intergroup contest experiments (pre-registered, total N = 750). After being randomly assigned to a green or yellow group, participants across three online studies performed three tasks. Task 1 elicited pre-conflict social preferences using a ‘helping task’. Task 2 elicited conflict participation and partner choices in an attacker-defender contest, and Task 3 elicited post-conflict social preferences again with the ‘helping task’. The decisions made in the helping task were used to classify them as either universal cooperators, parochial cooperators or selfish types. All decisions were fully incentivized and deception avoided.
Mixed regressions revealed that individuals prefer cooperators especially for coalitionary out-group attack (Exp. 1—3; Hypothesis 1), invest more in conflict when paired to partners with a cooperative rather than selfish reputation (Exp. 1—3), and expect partners with cooperative rather than selfish reputations to contribute more to conflict (Exp. 2—3). In line with previous findings that individuals cooperate more when seen by others, we find a robust effect of visibility on people’s cooperative behavior. Participants alter their helping decisions to become more parochial when these decisions can be seen by potential future partners (Exp. 1—3; Hypothesis 2a) and expected this to increase their likelihood of being included in coalitionary conflict (Exp. 3).
Our studies show that selecting cooperators alongside signaling cooperative reputation can solve free-rider problems during public goods provision, yet also escalates coalitionary conflict and its waste.
Intergroup conflict emerges when individuals coalesce in groups to compete with (individuals in) rivaling out-groups. Whereas the dynamics and consequences of intergroup conflict are increasingly well-understood, we lack insight into how individuals select others and form groups for coalitionary conflict.
To examine the possibility that (i) individuals prefer cooperators for coalitionary conflict yet (ii) cooperators signal selfishness to avoid being selected for conflict, we performed three experiments. We predicted that individuals prefer for coalitionary conflict partners with a cooperative rather than selfish reputation (Hypothesis 1). For reputation signaling, we had contrasting hypotheses. Past work on reputation signaling and partner selection in public goods provision suggests that individuals publicly signal cooperative inclinations (Hypothesis 2a). However, because joining coalitionary conflict may be individually unattractive, we also tested the alternative Hypothesis 2b that in intergroup contests individuals may prefer to publicly signal selfish rather than cooperative inclinations.
Predictions were tested in incentivized intergroup contest experiments (pre-registered, total N = 750). After being randomly assigned to a green or yellow group, participants across three online studies performed three tasks. Task 1 elicited pre-conflict social preferences using a ‘helping task’. Task 2 elicited conflict participation and partner choices in an attacker-defender contest, and Task 3 elicited post-conflict social preferences again with the ‘helping task’. The decisions made in the helping task were used to classify them as either universal cooperators, parochial cooperators or selfish types. All decisions were fully incentivized and deception avoided.
Mixed regressions revealed that individuals prefer cooperators especially for coalitionary out-group attack (Exp. 1—3; Hypothesis 1), invest more in conflict when paired to partners with a cooperative rather than selfish reputation (Exp. 1—3), and expect partners with cooperative rather than selfish reputations to contribute more to conflict (Exp. 2—3). In line with previous findings that individuals cooperate more when seen by others, we find a robust effect of visibility on people’s cooperative behavior. Participants alter their helping decisions to become more parochial when these decisions can be seen by potential future partners (Exp. 1—3; Hypothesis 2a) and expected this to increase their likelihood of being included in coalitionary conflict (Exp. 3).
Our studies show that selecting cooperators alongside signaling cooperative reputation can solve free-rider problems during public goods provision, yet also escalates coalitionary conflict and its waste.
Intergroup conflict emerges when individuals coalesce in groups to compete with (individuals in) rivaling out-groups. Whereas the dynamics and consequences of intergroup conflict are increasingly well-understood, we lack insight into how individuals select others and form groups for coalitionary conflict.