Intergroup Conflict as a By-Product of Parochial Prosociality
Conflict between groups is ubiquitous in time and place. Yet, why individuals cooperate with their group members to engage in potentially costly conflict with other groups remains poorly understood. Unravelling behavioral and structural ignitions of intergroup conflict is essential to, ultimately, prevent conflict onset and appease ongoing conflict.
Earlier work underlines how factors of intergroup relations, such as past wrong-doings and prejudices, can trigger intergroup conflict. Here, we focus on powerful individual-level motivations that may unfold in cooperation and conflict dilemmas within and between groups, such as greed and inequality aversion. Specifically, we examine the alternative possibility that conflicts can arise and escalate because individuals care for within-group prosperity and fairness, with out-group harm as a mere by-product of in-group care.
We hypothesized that individuals would cooperate more on a public good that provides higher than lower benefits for their in-group and that provides equal rather than unequal returns, also if optimizing efficiency and equality entails harming the out-group. We expected this to be especially the case for low-benefitting individuals from an unequal distribution, whereas high beneficiaries may accept harming the out-group to maximize their personal gains. Lastly, we aimed to explore how potential conflict may develop over time, and why.
There hypotheses were tested in two pre-registered, incentivized, non-deception laboratory group experiments focusing on efficiency (Study 1, N = 132) and equality concerns (Study 2, N = 210), respectively. Individuals could use personal resources to help their in-group by investing in club goods that varied in equality and efficiency, and did or did not impose costs on the out-group. In Study 1, they completed three blocks with 10 rounds each, with the club goods varying or meeting in efficiency while, in Study 2, they completed four blocks with 15 rounds each, with the blocks varying in whether one or both club good(s) provided (un)equal returns. Participants received feedback about decisions and earnings of all members of their group, as well as the deductions they received from the out-group after each round.
Using mixed-effects models, we investigated contributions based on the chosen club good, condition, round number, behavior of the other group in the previous round and, in case of inequality, the position as low, intermediate, or high beneficiary.
Results showed that the motivation to maximize in-group prosperity (Study 1) and to ensure fair distributions of benefits within one’s group (Study 2) can lead individuals to accept out-group harm as a by-product of their in-group cooperation. In fact, some group members preferred to cooperate on a club good that harms another group over cooperating on a club good that does not, when doing so prevented them from receiving less efficient (Study 1) or unequal returns (Study 2). Being harmed by another group in itself motivates retaliation, so that the motivation to maximize within-group prosperity and fairness can create a collectively costly cycle of harm and revenge.
We conclude that intergroup conflict can, at times, be a by-product of parochial pro-sociality and the motivation to care for the in-group.
Earlier work underlines how factors of intergroup relations, such as past wrong-doings and prejudices, can trigger intergroup conflict. Here, we focus on powerful individual-level motivations that may unfold in cooperation and conflict dilemmas within and between groups, such as greed and inequality aversion. Specifically, we examine the alternative possibility that conflicts can arise and escalate because individuals care for within-group prosperity and fairness, with out-group harm as a mere by-product of in-group care.
We hypothesized that individuals would cooperate more on a public good that provides higher than lower benefits for their in-group and that provides equal rather than unequal returns, also if optimizing efficiency and equality entails harming the out-group. We expected this to be especially the case for low-benefitting individuals from an unequal distribution, whereas high beneficiaries may accept harming the out-group to maximize their personal gains. Lastly, we aimed to explore how potential conflict may develop over time, and why.
There hypotheses were tested in two pre-registered, incentivized, non-deception laboratory group experiments focusing on efficiency (Study 1, N = 132) and equality concerns (Study 2, N = 210), respectively. Individuals could use personal resources to help their in-group by investing in club goods that varied in equality and efficiency, and did or did not impose costs on the out-group. In Study 1, they completed three blocks with 10 rounds each, with the club goods varying or meeting in efficiency while, in Study 2, they completed four blocks with 15 rounds each, with the blocks varying in whether one or both club good(s) provided (un)equal returns. Participants received feedback about decisions and earnings of all members of their group, as well as the deductions they received from the out-group after each round.
Using mixed-effects models, we investigated contributions based on the chosen club good, condition, round number, behavior of the other group in the previous round and, in case of inequality, the position as low, intermediate, or high beneficiary.
Results showed that the motivation to maximize in-group prosperity (Study 1) and to ensure fair distributions of benefits within one’s group (Study 2) can lead individuals to accept out-group harm as a by-product of their in-group cooperation. In fact, some group members preferred to cooperate on a club good that harms another group over cooperating on a club good that does not, when doing so prevented them from receiving less efficient (Study 1) or unequal returns (Study 2). Being harmed by another group in itself motivates retaliation, so that the motivation to maximize within-group prosperity and fairness can create a collectively costly cycle of harm and revenge.
We conclude that intergroup conflict can, at times, be a by-product of parochial pro-sociality and the motivation to care for the in-group.