The social dilemma of climate policy
Institutional solutions such as carbon taxes and cap-and-trade are needed to combat climate change. When implemented, such policies produce a global public good, but they may impose costs on local communities. This creates a social dilemma in the choice of climate policies. In this context, citizens may be opposed to globally efficient policies if they believe that other countries will not adopt similar steps to fight climate change. Thus, intergroup distrust can undermine the adoption of and compliance with the institutional solutions needed to mitigate climate change.
We conducted a cross-national survey (N = 604, Germany and US) in which we asked whether participants supported implementing several policies in their own country. We also elicited beliefs about support for these policies among participants from the other country. Strikingly, even individuals who were concerned about the threat of climate change were reluctant to endorse local policies if they believed that citizens in other countries did not support such policies. This highlights the role of intergroup trust in support for locally costly, but globally efficient climate policies.
Building on this initial evidence, we have developed a new experimental game which models the social dilemma of climate policy. Our design builds on the collective risk social dilemma (CRSD), in which groups must meet a contribution threshold to prevent the (probabilistic) loss of their private endowments. We extend the CRSD by allowing for externalities between multiple groups, which each must independently meet a threshold to prevent a catastrophic loss of income. We compare a baseline ‘local’ policy (the standard CRSD without externalities) with a ‘global’ policy in which contributions to the public good produce a positive externality for an out-group, but at the cost of being less effective towards meeting the in-group’s threshold. Crucially, the combined efficiency of contributions is greater in the ‘global’ condition than in the ‘local’ condition.
In our ‘exogenous’ treatments, policies are given; however, in the ‘endogenous’ treatment, groups can independently vote on policies. This models the social dilemma of choosing climate policies: if both groups adopt the ‘global’ policy, this maximises total efficiency across groups (i.e., minimises the sum of individual contributions needed to prevent income loss in both groups); however, each group can attain its greatest efficiency by unilaterally choosing the ‘local’ policy. Once policies are established, individuals can make contributions towards the group’s threshold (but may choose to freeride on their peers’ contributions).
Initially data suggests that many participants are willing to support globally efficient policies. We are currently setting up the full, preregistered study (expected N = 1,600) and anticipate to complete data collection by the end of February. We will test (a) support for locally costly, but globally efficient policies, (b) whether individuals are more willing to comply with globally efficient policies if they are established democratically (a ‘dividend of democracy’), and (c) the effect of intergroup trust on support for globally efficient policies and policy compliance. Insights from this project have the potential to inform interventions to promote support for efficient climate policies.
We conducted a cross-national survey (N = 604, Germany and US) in which we asked whether participants supported implementing several policies in their own country. We also elicited beliefs about support for these policies among participants from the other country. Strikingly, even individuals who were concerned about the threat of climate change were reluctant to endorse local policies if they believed that citizens in other countries did not support such policies. This highlights the role of intergroup trust in support for locally costly, but globally efficient climate policies.
Building on this initial evidence, we have developed a new experimental game which models the social dilemma of climate policy. Our design builds on the collective risk social dilemma (CRSD), in which groups must meet a contribution threshold to prevent the (probabilistic) loss of their private endowments. We extend the CRSD by allowing for externalities between multiple groups, which each must independently meet a threshold to prevent a catastrophic loss of income. We compare a baseline ‘local’ policy (the standard CRSD without externalities) with a ‘global’ policy in which contributions to the public good produce a positive externality for an out-group, but at the cost of being less effective towards meeting the in-group’s threshold. Crucially, the combined efficiency of contributions is greater in the ‘global’ condition than in the ‘local’ condition.
In our ‘exogenous’ treatments, policies are given; however, in the ‘endogenous’ treatment, groups can independently vote on policies. This models the social dilemma of choosing climate policies: if both groups adopt the ‘global’ policy, this maximises total efficiency across groups (i.e., minimises the sum of individual contributions needed to prevent income loss in both groups); however, each group can attain its greatest efficiency by unilaterally choosing the ‘local’ policy. Once policies are established, individuals can make contributions towards the group’s threshold (but may choose to freeride on their peers’ contributions).
Initially data suggests that many participants are willing to support globally efficient policies. We are currently setting up the full, preregistered study (expected N = 1,600) and anticipate to complete data collection by the end of February. We will test (a) support for locally costly, but globally efficient policies, (b) whether individuals are more willing to comply with globally efficient policies if they are established democratically (a ‘dividend of democracy’), and (c) the effect of intergroup trust on support for globally efficient policies and policy compliance. Insights from this project have the potential to inform interventions to promote support for efficient climate policies.