09:30 - 11:00
Fri-PS4
Chair/s:
Annatina Aerne
Room: Room 101
Noémi Berlin - Feedback and cooperation: An Experiment on sorting behaviour
Lisa Spantig - Signaling effects of incentives: An experiment in a cooperative company
Annatina Aerne - How to achieve cooperation in employer referral networks
Feedback and cooperation: An Experiment on sorting behaviour
Noémi Berlin 1, Mamadou Gueye 2, Stéphanie Monjon 3
1 CNRS, EconomiX, University Paris Nanterre
2 ANIA
3 CGEMP, LEDa, Université Paris Dauphine
In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the effect of information provision (feedback) on individual sorting behavior. To be effective, sorting must be a mixture of quantity and quality. However, increasing quantity may reduce quality due to the increasing risk of contamination. We consider a two-stage coordination game in which individuals first choose whether or not to participate in the sorting activity, and then select the mixture of quantity
and quality (performance) that they provide. In this situation, information about the partner’s past performance and information about one’s own past performance are used as incentive instruments. Using a between-subjects experimental design, we find that information about the partner’s prior performance leads to better performance. Our results suggest that providing feedback about own performance to an individual who decides to engage in a sorting activity has a positive impact on both the quantity and quality of waste they sort.