Trading-off efficient and visible pro-environmental actions
Climate change, extinction of species, and excessive pollution are salient problems and many people take individual actions to address environmental problems themselves. Individuals who are intrinsically concerned about the environment should care about maximizing the impact of their actions. However, individuals frequently engage in pro-environment behaviours (PEBs) that are rather inefficient in terms of their cost-benefit-ratio. In this paper, we suggest that this is not just a lack of awareness on the efficiency of different PEBs. Rather individuals might deliberately trade-off visible for efficient PEBs. In a large-scale online experiment in Germany, we investigate into this trade-off between efficient and visible PEBs. More importantly, we ask why individuals prefer inefficient but visible PEBs. One potential reason to choose a visible action is a self-serving one: they have a preference for being perceived as ‘green’ by others due to social and self image concerns. Another reason to engage in visible instead of efficient behaviours is to influence and hence, change the behaviour of others. This may activate a social multiplier and turn a previously inefficient action into an efficient one.