Is polarization over and above norms?
An experimental study on the role of social norms in political discrimination
Previous studies have documented the primacy of partisan affective polarisation over other social cleavages (i.e. race, religion or ethnic identities) in western democracies. Partisan affective polarisation is understood as a form of hostility and prejudice that operates across political lines. It involves interpersonal evaluations and behaviours towards other individuals based on their political affiliation, and may result in social, political and economic discrimination. The question is why do people engage in interpersonal hostilities with others based on their partisanship more than in the case of regional, linguistic, ethnic or religious differences? An increasingly common answer is that interactions across race, religion, gender and other social divides are constrained by social norms, but there are no corresponding pressures or sanctions that prevent discrimination and hostility towards political opponents.
Here, we test this “lack-of-social-norms” hypothesis on political discrimination using a series of laboratory experiments and a sample of 242 subjects. In the laboratory, we prime participants to think about particular dimensions of their identities. In each session, participants belong to four different identity groups. The priming aims to trigger a process of social identification by encouraging subjects to identify with some participants in their experimental session with whom they share an identity and not with others. In the decision-making phase of the experiment, we use a standard distribution game in which participants allocate a given amount of money between two potential recipients, one an individual sharing their primed identity (in-group), the other an individual not sharing their primed identity (out-group). Discrimination is defined as the extent to which individuals are willing to allocate more money to members of their own social group at the expense of the out-group. We also measure social appropriateness of every possible outcome of the distribution game using a standard social norms elicitation task.
The dimension of identity that is primed is varied exogenously between religious affiliation, as an identity that is subject to social norms, and partisanship and a minimal-group-identity treatment, where we expect norms to fail. Each experimental session is framed around one of these identities. We find that individuals rate discrimination as less socially appropriate when identities are based on religious affiliation, and consequently they barely deviate from an equal-split distribution. On the contrary, individuals discriminate the most when identities are defined by partisanship, and that behaviour is deemed as less inappropriate. When identities are defined by a random draw of coloured balls, discrimination is higher than in the religious setting, but not as much as in the case of partisanship. From these results we conclude that individuals are more willing to discriminate in favour of their group when they know they face a political opponent. Social norms fail to restrict interpersonal hostilities in the realm of politic affiliation.
Here, we test this “lack-of-social-norms” hypothesis on political discrimination using a series of laboratory experiments and a sample of 242 subjects. In the laboratory, we prime participants to think about particular dimensions of their identities. In each session, participants belong to four different identity groups. The priming aims to trigger a process of social identification by encouraging subjects to identify with some participants in their experimental session with whom they share an identity and not with others. In the decision-making phase of the experiment, we use a standard distribution game in which participants allocate a given amount of money between two potential recipients, one an individual sharing their primed identity (in-group), the other an individual not sharing their primed identity (out-group). Discrimination is defined as the extent to which individuals are willing to allocate more money to members of their own social group at the expense of the out-group. We also measure social appropriateness of every possible outcome of the distribution game using a standard social norms elicitation task.
The dimension of identity that is primed is varied exogenously between religious affiliation, as an identity that is subject to social norms, and partisanship and a minimal-group-identity treatment, where we expect norms to fail. Each experimental session is framed around one of these identities. We find that individuals rate discrimination as less socially appropriate when identities are based on religious affiliation, and consequently they barely deviate from an equal-split distribution. On the contrary, individuals discriminate the most when identities are defined by partisanship, and that behaviour is deemed as less inappropriate. When identities are defined by a random draw of coloured balls, discrimination is higher than in the religious setting, but not as much as in the case of partisanship. From these results we conclude that individuals are more willing to discriminate in favour of their group when they know they face a political opponent. Social norms fail to restrict interpersonal hostilities in the realm of politic affiliation.