Much of the research on lying focuses on the potential lie-teller, whereas the lie-receiver remains understudied. This study provides a comprehensive analysis of how people respond to possible lies. Our 2x2 design includes one-shot and finitely repeated interactions, with and without receivers having an opportunity to provide positive or negative feedback to their senders. In our design, receivers get an uncertain payoff that depends in part on the sender's lying behavior and in part on a random factor so that the receiver cannot tell with certainty whether a sender lied or told the truth. In the no-feedback condition, receivers are asked to suggest hypothetical feedback that does not reach the sender. We find evidence that receivers are less likely to give negative feedback to a partner with whom they will interact in the future than to a stranger in a one-shot game, and such difference is driven by strategic self-interested behavior in expectation of future monetary benefits. We distinguish strategic and non-strategic motivations behind receiver responses by comparing actual and hypothetical feedback behaviors; We find that learning plays an important role in facilitating self-serving strategy in repeated interactions with real feedback, where receivers exploit what they learn about their senders to guide their strategic responses.