This paper considers how political competition and the economic condition of European Union member states interact to affect decision making at the European Court of Justice. Building on extant literature highlighting the influence of economic conditions on public support for European integration as well as theoretical accounts emphasizing the influence the cost of compliance for a member-state government exerts on the willingness of the European Court of Justice to rule counter to the government's preferences, I argue that poor economic conditions in a member state should correspond to a more deferential Court of Justice. I then extend this argument to account for the level of political competition facing the government by positing that the impact of economic conditions on decision making is conditioned by the electoral strength or weakness of the incumbent. An analysis of all legal issues brought to the Court from 1980 to 1998 in preliminary reference and infringement proceedings finds support for these expectations. Specifically, the Court was more likely to rule against the preferences of the member-state government when economic conditions are poor and the government faces strong electoral competition.