The role of politicians' gender is increasingly recognized as crucial for foreign policy decision-making. In foreign aid, there is copious evidence that more women in parliament lead to not more but also higher quality foreign aid allocations. However, we lack examinations whether the purported mechanism, that women legislators have different preferences in aid upon which they act, actually is at play. In this paper, we introduce not only a novel conjoint survey experiment to examine electoral incentives of legislators in the context of foreign aid depending on gender, but also reexamine several different areas of legislative behavior for evidence that women legislators prioritize foreign aid more. Specifically, we analyze roll call votes, inquiries with bureaucracies, co-sponsorship, and expressed attitudes at parliamentary hearings about foreign aid. Our analyses in the U.S. Congress since the 1970s suggest that there is no evidence to be found that women legislators behave differently in the context of foreign aid. We conclude by proposing ways to reconcile existing and our findings.