13:30 - 15:00
Panel Session 4
Room: Zoom
Moderator/s:
Bargaining and Diplomatic Visits
Alastair Smith
New York University, New York

Visits with US President are valuable to political leaders. A formal model examines the concession the President can obtain by granting a visit. The President does not want to visit leaders who will not be around to implement agreements. Hence, a US diplomatic visit signals that the US believes that a leader is secure in office. This signal deters domestic adversaries. Empirically a visit with the US President reduces the risk of leader deposition by 50-70%. A game theoretic model explores how diplomatic visits can help prop up friendly leaders and extract concessions from others. The model characterizes the size of optimal concessions, the optimal investment in intelligence to assess survival prospects and contrasts the efficiency of diplomatic visits with aid or direct intervention.


Reference:
Fr-P4-01
Session:
International Relations and Conflict
Presenter/s:
Alastair Smith
Topic:
EU Politics
Presentation type:
Oral presentation
Room:
Zoom
Date:
Friday, 19 June
Time:
13:30 - 13:45
Session times:
13:30 - 15:00

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