Delegation patterns in the EU are thought to be defined by a variety of factors such as conflict between principals, peculiarity of legislation itself, and the location of principals’ preferences vis-à-vis each other. However, extant literature does not examine whether decision to delegate power to the agency may have effect on behaviour of the actors in the most powerful institution within the Union, namely Council of Ministers. This paper seeks to bridge this gap by examining to what extent likelihood of different types of dissent in the Council is affected by the amount of power the principals agree to transfer to the agency. I argue that increasing delegation motivates government representatives to signal their dissent. Specifically, I maintain that increasing delegation of power to the agency is likely to boost the likelihood of abstention votes and negative statements the members issue during formal voting stage. However, the power of the agency does not affect the chances of open opposition within the Council as it is more likely to foster underlying conflicts and emphasize non-cooperative behaviour of the actors. The peculiar patterns of behaviour suggests the importance of conflict acvoidance among the Ministers. The paper contributes to both literature on delegation choices in the EU as well as to the studies concerned with the bargaining and signalling games in the Council of Ministers.