Are Americans’ policy preferences constrained by ideological belief systems? If so, what does this imply? After more than fifty years of research, consensus remains elusive. We bring clarity to this debate by addressing three vital questions: First, researchers operationalize constraint based on their own expectations, but is there really normative consensus among ideology group members on “what goes with what?” Using an incentivized coordination game, we find substantial variability in the clarity of ideological norms across issues. Second, the extant literature equates lack of constraint with political ignorance, but how many seemingly “ideologically innocent” voters know “what goes with what” yet choose to flout these norms? When we measure political beliefs and knowledge of ideological norms separately, it becomes clear that ignorance and pragmatism are typically conflated. Third, does constraint facilitate accountability or does it just represent strong adherence to ideological norms? Using a survey experiment, we find that priming norms increases adherence. This suggests that the most ideologically constrained are the strongest norm followers and perhaps not best suited to ensure accountability.