Why are transparency regimes so rare - even if one side might have something to hide, why would their opponents not push for transparency? To analyze transitional justice, we build a model that explains why politicians might prefer to maintain circumstances allowing for blackmail with embarrassing skeletons in the closet instead of truth revelation. We model the interaction between an incumbent politician, an opposition politician, a strategic blackmailer, who has access to \emph{kompromat}, and voters. The incumbent and the voters know that the opposition politician may be compromised and are aware of a blackmailer. The blackmailer can release \emph{kompromat} against opposition politicians. The incumbent can implement a transparency regime, which would make blackmail impossible. We show that she, instead, might strategically opt for an non-transparency regime that would keep the skeletons in the closet as it is easier to run against a maybe-tainted opponent. Our results are corroborated with data from the Global Transitional Justice Dataset.